Abstract-We analyze a recent RFID lightweight authentication protocol, namely EOHLCAP scheme. Based on our analysis, however, a new traceability attack algorithm makes the scheme insecurity, if the attacker has the ability to distinguish the target tag. Some lightweight authentication protocols are susceptible to the similar traceability attack, so we propose a new traceability attack algorithm. More precisely, we also show how our attack algorithm can be applied to the older schemes. To counteract such security issue, we revise the EOHLCAP scheme with the rotation operation and show that the proposed model satisfies the indistinguishability property. Finally, we introduce a revised protocol, namely EOHLCAP+ scheme, which conforms to the security requirement and resists the tracing attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, RFID system has become popular due to its advantages over large scale applications. Recently, RFID protocols against tracing attack are proposed to meet the security requirements in many applications. Many RFID protocol designers not only cryptanalyze on the structure of protocol but also pay close attention to its security and privacy issues. And an attacker should not be able to trace the actions of a tag. In this case, these related security issues are addressed by protocol designers. It means that it should be hard for any attackers to recognize any tag that previously observed or interacted with. This security property is typically referred to as forward untraceability.
However, some authors of protocols [1] [2] were designed the various types of attack algorithms to violate forward untraceability, such as passive full disclosure attack, differential attack, brute-force attack, passive attack…and so on. In order to fulfill the security requirements of protocol, it is urgent for protocol designer to solve the issues of tracing attack.
Recently RFID authentication protocols have been proposed with major or minor flaws. Then, some authors suggested the generalization of the tracing attack for similar protocol. Protocols in RFID system are designed empirically, but most of them are weak in various ways. Specifically, the pioneer protocols of the OHLCAP family have deficiencies, and are vulnerable to tracing attack.
Another fundamental issues addressed on RFID systems is privacy. A problem closely related to privacy is tracking, or violations of location privacy. Most of the time, the tags always use the same expression in the protocol, which will allow an adversary to deduce an association between the different expressions easily. Even in the case the attackers try to disclose the tag's secret key by using monitored variables, because this tracing attack is still possible.
It is straightforward to design the solutions for the tracing problems. Some research has focused on the protocol design against tracing attack. Nevertheless, the interesting case [3] is the attack algorithms because it does not need many runs of a true protocol to implement.
In this paper, we review the enhancement of one-way hash based low-cost authentication protocol (EOHLCAP) [4] and put forward the tracing problems on the protocol.
The article is organized as follows. We present introduction in Section I and set up related work and preliminary in Section II. Then we study the EOHLCAP protocol in Section III. Next, Section IV puts forward our new scheme, while Section V summarizes our new scheme.
II. RELATED WORK AND PRELIMINARY

A. Related Work
Many structures of lightweight proposals have some potential secure problems. As a consequence, those schemes have proposed some kinds of attack algorithms to test and verify the weakness of RFID protocols.
Moreover we introduce the proposed traceability attacks algorithm and apply it in the EOHLCAP protocol.
The traceability attacks are based on two main weaknesses of the EOHLCAP protocol.
First, the author assumes that tags support a hash function and a PRNG function. Nevertheless, the abuses of the XOR and AND operations (namely bitwise operations, triangular operations) in some protocols [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] , lead to the tracing problems.
Each bit depends only on bits with the same or bigger indices. As a result, the LSBs are independent of every other bit. Taking into account only the LSB, XOR operation and addition modulo operation are the same and can use this observation to deduce the next LSBs. We do not make a difference between ⊕ and +.
The bitwise XOR and AND operations in different messages are another weakness of the EOHLCAP protocol. However, inherent weakness of the triangular operations is violation of the protocol. This can happen when the attackers exploit the relations between different variables in the same equation.
Several attack algorithms have been proposed as follows. Dimitriou's scheme [10] applies a secret shared between the tag and the DB that is refreshed to resist tag tracing attack. Additionally, efficiency of authentication is sacrificed. However, the revision is very effective and it can be implemented easily with shift functions.
The protocol [11] introduces a traceability attack that exploits the weak properties of Per(.), since it discloses several bits of the ID instead of just one. The attack can be extended to disclose the whole ID at the expense of requiring various protocol runs.
In [12] , the authors present passive attacks to expose all bits of the secrets shared by the reader and tag by monitoring about 20 rounds of the true protocol.
In [3] , the complexity of the proposed attacks is only several runs of the protocols.
In this paper, we will examine most recent proposals in depth and identify the proposed tracing attack algorithm in our design. Then, proper proofs based on indiscernibility are provided in the revised protocol.
B. Notations and Requirements
Untraceability has been defined in [13] . Definition1. Forward security [14] . An attacker may disclose secret keys stored on tag's memory as these devices are susceptible to physical manipulation. In certain scenarios, privacy of past communications has to be guaranteed even if a tag is compromised some time later. This property is commonly named as forward security. Indeed, there are some RFID authentication protocols [15] [16] that claim to satisfy this property.
Nevertheless, the design of RFID lightweight protocol with forward security is an open problem.
Inspired by EOHLCAP scheme, we evaluate the performance of our revised protocol using the following four criteria.
(1) The number of messages transmitted on the channel.
(2) The storage of the whole computations performed by tags and database respectively. (4) The computation cost of identifying a tag in the back-end database.
We adopt the following notations and definitions in TABLE I. 
C(a,b,k)
Carry for modular addition [17] ,
The hash value of a tag identifier Had Hash address h(ID), acting as an index
The right (left) half of B r 1 ,r 2 l bit random number LSB Least significant bit (LSB of X is X 0 ) MSB Most significant bit (the MSB is X n-1 ) Secure RFID schemes for constructing good structure should fulfill security requirements [14] , which are described as follows:
-Resistance to traceability attacks: An attacker outsider monitors previous messages and repeatedly sends them to trace the target tag. However, not only the target tag but also other tags may respond the response which looks indiscernible to the attacker.
-Resistance to tag impersonation attacks: Even if the attacker can disguise the target tags, s/he will not be able to be authenticated by the database.
-Resistance to desynchronization attacks: If one entity can not receive the correct messages, it does not update its state while the other entity has done; leading to a desynchronization between two entities.
-Forward traceability: Mutual authentication schemes should achieve forward traceability. Even if the attacker can disclose the tags' secrets, s/he will not be able to trace the past interactions of the tags' owner because the secrets are encrypted securely through appropriate operations.
III. CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE EOHLCAP PROTOCOL
A. The EOHLCAP Protocol
The EOHLCAP protocol is shown in Fig. 1 The next specific steps are described as bellow:
Step 1: The reader randomly generates r 1 and transmits it to a tag.
Step ( ) GI A r r = − ⊕ , then finds the ID in the GI by checking the B R . The DB authenticates the tag by checking that the computed B R equals to the received one, and then forwards the B L to the tag.
Step 5: Upon reception of B L , the tag authenticates the reader by checking whether the received B L equals to the previously computed one.
B. Traceability Attack on EOHLCAP Protocol
Morshed et al. [4] have proposed the EOHLCAP protocol using two different random numbers to make the transferred messages unpredictable. As a result, it is difficult to perform tracing attack, DoS attack, impersonation and replay attack. However, in this section we present an efficient traceability attack algorithm against their protocols. The tracing attacks are proposed to break forward security of lightweight scheme. The equations of the EOHLCAP protocol are listed in Fig. 1 . Then, we list the equations easily that as follow:
From different rounds of protocol, the opponent can easily monitor information about the random variables r 1 , A 1 and A 2 with the help of the disclosure bits of GI and K, respectively. The addition modulo 2 96 has no difficulty in disclosing all bits of GI and K, if we know every bit from right hand side to left.
Lemma1. For the target tag, the adversary query t rounds authentication messages using the i-th round 
..,t) can be extracted from the table. Then the adversary can calculate and store the messages {[r 1 | k … 0 for it has 96 bits, but we can observe that the operations in (5) only include XOR bitwise operations and addition module operation, which have the property that the operation of the MSB has no influence on the LSB, which means we can test the variables bit by bit.
In addition, it is easy to find the operations in (8) are all XOR bitwise operations, which mean we can guess the values of {GI, K} bit by bit.
There are only two possible pairs for the values {GI| k , K| k }.Thus we get the following algorithm to trace the target tag in EOHLCAP scheme.
Algorithm1. Traceability attack algorithm aim at the EOHLCAP scheme.
After testing about i rounds of EOHLCAP authentication messages, the adversary can implement a traceability attack algorithm as follows:
Step 1: (Training) The adversary A creates a i ≠ 0, it does as follows:
| k … 0 and the right half of the computed hash value B R to the reader.
Step 
, an important distinction must be made: The attacker knows that the target tag does not output the messages. The EOHLCAP protocol can not meet security requirement of indistinguishability.
(b) The correct cryptanalysis ends here and yields r 1 Example1. Citing the traceability attack in EOHLCAP protocol, Let us illustrate with an example with reduced bits.
Step 1: (Training)
Using Lemma 1, the adversary thus has a test on each bit of r 1 from 0 to 2 k+1 -1, by simply testing on r 1 , A 1 and A 2 . Using the same approach than the one described in Algorithm 1, the adversary can combine the partial knowledge of each run to get a more and more reliable knowledge of GI and K.
We can also describe the traceability attack on the LSB of the messages{ [ Step 3: (Decision): . A discloses one bit of information about the GI and K, which remains unchanged during all the tag's life. The adversary deduces the LSB of the GI and K.
The adversary can execute the next one bits concatenating the first bit just as the attack on EOHLCAP PROTOCOL.
(2)Test two LSBs of r 1 We test two bits of the message rather than just one. We note here that formal traceability models not only require the disclosure of just one bit, but also need more bits to trace the target tags.
So This may be used to verify whether the messages are or not the target tag's output. Since the opponent distinguish the target tag with the probability 1/4, EOHLCAP PROTOCOL does not achieve the indiscernibility property. A discloses two bits of information about the GI and K, which remains unchanged during all the tag's life. The adversary deduces the next LSB of the GI and K.
The adversary can procceed the next one bits concatenating the two bits just as the attack on EOHLCAP scheme.
(3) Test three LSBs of r 1 For instance, if the attacker wants to disclose 3 bits of variable to test, the success probability is approximately 1/8. The attack can be extended to test the whole bits of r 1 at the expense of requiring only one protocol run.
This process can be repeated to retrieve the values of secrets GI and K.
C. A Toy Example
We assume the example works on 3-bit strings. All addition operations are performed mod 2 3 . let GI=010, K=101, and eavesdropped the messages {[r 1 ] A discloses two bits of secret key about the GI and K, which remains unchanged during all the tag's life. The adversary deduces the second LSB of the GI and K.
Given GI| 0 =0 and [ On the termination of the attack algorithm, the original protocol does not achieve the indistinguishability property. When the adversary decide that T' m is not the target tag T m , we conclude that the EOHLCAP scheme does not achieve the property of indiscernibility.
D. Attack Summery
The total complexity of the given attack algorithm is i sessions in the step 1 plus one session in the step 2. The probability of the success decision made the correct decision in the step 3 can be determined as follows:
(1) For any entry r 1 , A 1 , A 2 in TABLE j , we denote the expected value of the target tag should satisfy the following conditionsin：
(2) This condition is satisfied for T' m = T m with a probability bounded by 2 -(k+1) . (3) The probability of the success decision Pr succ is judged as follows:
We conclude that the attacker's advantage to distinguish the target tag's output from the given outputs approximately is 1.
We implement i runs of EOHLCAP protocol. Compared with other attack algorithms, we conclude that the efficiency of proposed tracking attack algorithm to be superior.
Meanwhile, the protocol [11] and protocol [12] will require 16 and 20 runs respectively.
IV. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
After analyzing our attack algorithm, we identify that the algorithm can be applied to the EOHLCAP protocol. It will be necessary for us to enhance the scheme. Subsequently, we put forward namely EOHLCAP+ protocol.
Bitwise operations should be combined with shift function in same expression to hinder the task to cryptanalysis [9] . To be more precise, the tags' response should include fresh random variable as one of inputs to the shift functions invoked. In particular, the composition of the input data using rotation functions should prevent that an adversary may set arbitrarily the input value.
Since the introduction of the distinguishable property, many new schemes have been proposed. In general, the tracking attack methodology is efficiency. Therefore, it is necessary for designing the security revision from a global perspective. Only after analysis of the complete revision, we identify that the enhanced protocol is untracable. We introduce the shift function to slove the tracking issue. There are only two data fields ID and K in the tag side. The database uses three data fields h(ID), ID and K. The proposed protocol uses the hash value h(ID) as the hash address in the DB to search the tag information. The steps are given as follows:
Step 1: R randomly generates r 1 and transmits it to T.
Step A A = ，the DB authenticates T by checking that the computed B R equals to the received one, then forwards the B L to T.
Step 5: Upon reception of B L , T authenticates R by checking whether the received B L equals to the computed value. encrypted with the random value r 2 are always unpredictable. The random nonce r 2 is secret and varying in each session, while A 2 is also varying and new in each round. Owing to the shift functions in two parts of the expression, it is not feasible to extract the variation part from the expression using the messages to track the tag. Hence, the tag sends new message A 2 for each round, which is indistinguishable and unpredictable from other rounds. Therefore, the traceability, impersonation and desynchronization attacks are not possible.
Our scheme enforces forward untraceability as it prevents variable A 2 to be computed by attacker. This is due to the fact that none of the secrets of the target tag can be calculated with the shift operation, as the shifted values get refreshed periodically.
Nevertheless, the shift operators needs to be computed in protocol and conflicts with reducing the computational complexity. We will solve this conflict issue as the main motivation of future work.
B. Efficiency Analysis
Our revision meets the demand of the performance at tag and server side. To reduce the computational complexities of the revised protocol, we take into account computationally complex functions as the rotation function r 2 /4.
The efficiency properties comparisons between proposed protocol and other protocols are shown in TABLE IX. Storage: In the revision, the tag will need to store its secret GI and K both is l-bit strings. For the DB side, the DB needs to store 3l, which are h(ID), K and ID at the RFID system. For EMAP and EOHLCAP scheme, the tag needs to store 2l and 3l respectively, which are relatively huge compared to the revision; Meanwhile all the server needs to store 3l.
Communication cost: In the revision, the communication cost increases to protect against tracking attack algorithm. Therefore, the tag consumes total communication of 2s+2h+3XOR; Meanwhile the EMAP and EOHLCAP scheme participate with 2s+3h+4XOR and 1h+2XOR respectively. The DB side in the revision consumes 2s+2h+5XOR in total; while the EMAP and EOHLCAP scheme participate with 2s+1h+3XOR and 1h+2XOR respectively. In EOHLCAP scheme, the matter is different because the shift operations used in the formula can resist tracking attack.
Nevertheless, the huge communication cost at the DB exercises a little influence on the modified protocol, because the DB has the perfect storage and computing power to be implemented communication as well.
The shift functions are very high-powered in terms of efficiency and the computation costs of the DB are a bit higher, just like two shift functions computations are needed like EOHLCAP scheme. However, these shift operations require providing perfect forward secrecy. In this case, our proposed scheme can provide the perfect forward secrecy. From TABLE IX, we can see that the proposed scheme has the highest efficiency and is well suited to RFID applications.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We compare the efficiency of our method with other tracing attack algorithms. As a result, the tracing attack algorithm we proposed in this article is more efficient.
In addition, our revised protocol is resistant to tracing attack described in the previous section. Furthermore, even when the tag reveals its secrets ID and K to the attacker, untraceable is guaranteed. The indiscernibility property will remain secure as shifted value change.
In summary, the design of secure and efficient RFID lightweight protocol is not perfect yet. The revised protocol represents a step further to achieve this objective. Nevertheless, the revised protocol proved with appropriate formal model is untraceability in the future. 
